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between Dewey and Aristotle indicate actual lineage and 
are more than interesting points of overlap.
Chapter three, “Change in Dewey’s and Aristotle’s Self,” 
examines Dewey’s and Aristotle’s ethics. Again, Fischer 
uses the many affinities between the two accounts to claim 
that Dewey’s ethics should be understood as Aristotelian. 
Both conceive of the self as inherently social, both find 
ethics and politics inseparable, and both conceive of 
character as formed via the development of habits. 
Fischer points out, however, that differences between the 
two views are crucial in making Dewey’s conception of the 
self a suitable starting point for constructing a feminist 
self. Aristotle places humans into a natural hierarchy, 
with all women and some men inferior to a class of elite, 
rational males. With Dewey’s interactionist view of the 
relation between self and environment, the self is more 
fluid. My reading of this chapter is the same as for chapter 
two. As a compare and contrast essay, it is very well 
done. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, theorists working within evolutionary paradigms 
commonly used the basic terms with which Dewey 
constructed his theory of the self. They often described 
society as an organism, considered morality as largely 
based on custom, and understood animal and human 
behavior in terms of habits. Because Fischer does not 
assess whether Dewey could have derived his conception 
of the self from within the evolutionary theorizing of his 
day, her claim that Dewey based much of his conception 
on Aristotle is unconvincing.
Part II, “Feminist-Pragmatist Reconstruction of Change” 
(chapters four and five), takes Dewey’s conception of the 
self, reconstructs it with a feminist lens, and uses that 
to address possibilities for feminist democratic change. 
Now there are many ways to structure a monograph, 
from a collection of separate articles that share common 
themes, to an integrated whole. I read the book as closer 
to the former. Linkage between the two parts depends on 
Fischer’s claim that Dewey to a significant extent drew his 
metaphysics and ethics from Aristotle. Had Fischer placed 
her presentation of Dewey’s conception of the self in Part 
II rather than Part I, Part II could be read separately. This is 
not a criticism as much as an observation about how the 
book is constructed.
Chapter four, “The Feminist-Pragmatist Self,” looks for a 
conception of the self that can account for the experience 
some women have of coming to feminist consciousness. 
They sometimes report that for a period of time everything 
seemed to be a jumbled confusion, and they emerged 
totally transformed. Fischer begins with Dewey’s model of 
the social self, formed in interaction with the environment. 
Habits formed as adaptations to the environment give 
stability, yet often are flexible enough to change. Fischer 
explicates coming to feminist consciousness in terms of 
substituting habits of perceiving situations through feminist 
lenses for non-feminist perceptual habits. The process is 
gradual, beginning with a few habits which then interact 
with and lead to change in more habits; hence the period 
of confusion. Fischer stresses the need for careful self-
reflection, especially to bring unconscious non-feminist 
habits into conscious awareness. While what Fischer does 
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Fischer casts a wide net in seeking a conception of change 
with which to understand feminist transformation of both 
self and social institutions. She explores metaphysical, 
epistemological, ethical, and political theories of change in 
developing a feminist-pragmatist approach. Writing clearly 
and carefully, Fischer employs her knowledge of relevant 
primary and secondary texts deftly. She has a particularly 
admirable ability to appreciate what various philosophers 
have to offer while honestly appraising and seeking 
remedies for weaknesses in their theories.
Part I, “Genealogical Reflections on Change,” contains 
three chapters. The first, “Women, Change, and the Birth 
of Philosophy,” sets up why a feminist account of change 
is needed. Fischer begins with Parmenides and the 
ambiguous role of the goddess in his poem, “On Nature.” 
She pairs this with analyses of the a-sexual birth of Athena 
as Athen’s creation myth, Pandora’s evil interventions into 
the harmonious all-male world, and Aristotle’s gendered 
account of reproduction. This gives strong support to 
Fischer’s claim that, in Greek myth and philosophy, women 
occupy a role she calls gendered (im)mutability. If change 
is illusory or bad, women are active agents responsible for 
evil. If change is good, women are passive and not fully 
human.
Chapter two, “Change in Dewey’s and Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics,” compares Dewey’s and Aristotle’s accounts 
of how the world exhibits both change and stability. For 
example, seasons and individuals undergo constant change, 
but they do so in fairly stable and predictable patterns. 
While fully acknowledging differences between Aristotle’s 
teleological hylomorphism and Dewey’s emphasis on non-
teleological interaction among organisms and environment, 
Fischer is particularly struck by the two thinkers’ affinities. 
Both are naturalists and work out the relation between 
change and stability within nature, without appealing to the 
transcendent realm. Fischer concludes first, that Dewey’s 
account of change owes much to Aristotle, and second, 
that Dewey’s differences from Aristotle give an opening 
for using Dewey’s metaphysics toward construction of 
a feminist analysis of the self. The chapter itself contains 
little feminist analysis. If read as a compare and contrast 
essay, the chapter is very well done and supports the 
second conclusion. I am not convinced by Fischer’s first 
conclusion, however. Both philosophers were working 
within the scientific theories of their time. While Dewey 
had studied Aristotle, he wrote in an era when Darwin’s 
evolutionary theory served as the generative metaphor 
in every discipline. Dewey could well have developed 
his theory using the intellectual resources of his time. A 
different sort of argument is needed to show that affinities 
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written and many issues are thoughtfully addressed. 
Fischer’s achievement is impressive.
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Margaret Holmgren’s Forgiveness and Retribution: 
Responding to Wrongdoing is a refreshingly bold attempt 
to argue for an unpopular, often marginalized position 
within the forgiveness literature: that unconditional 
forgiveness and self-forgiveness are always morally 
appropriate, even when an offender has not apologized. 
Holmgren presents the “paradigm of forgiveness” as a way 
of responding to wrongdoing that is opposed to “attitudinal 
retributivism,” which she characterizes as the idea that 
“enduring attitudes of resentment and self-condemnation 
are morally appropriate under certain circumstances” (5). 
Holmgren argues that such attitudes of resentment and 
self-condemnation are never appropriate.
In chapter one, Holmgren offers an outline of her project 
and provides an initial characterization of the attitudinal 
retributivist position that forms her target throughout the 
work. Attitudinal retributivists, on Holmgren’s account, 
argue that forgiveness is inappropriate or even blameworthy 
in circumstances where an offender has not apologized 
or repented. This is because granting forgiveness to an 
offender without his apology can demonstrate that the 
victim lacks of self-respect, lacks respect for the offender, 
or lacks a general respect for the demands of morality 
(9). Holmgren then proceeds to argue that adopting an 
attitude of “unconditional genuine forgiveness” not only 
demonstrates self-respect, respect for the offender, and 
respect for morality, but meets these criteria more fully and 
completely than attitudinal retributivism (9).
Holmgren characterizes unconditional genuine forgiveness 
as a virtue—which she defines as an ingrained, integrated 
attitude. In chapter two, Holmgren contrasts the attitude 
that forms the paradigm of forgiveness with those that 
form the paradigm of retribution and argues for the moral 
superiority of the attitude of forgiveness. For Holmgren, 
attitudes have a cognitive component, an affective 
component, and a motivational component (23). For an 
individual to possess the complete, integrated attitude of 
forgiveness, one must form the belief that the offender is 
a sentient being and moral agent who, as such, deserves 
respect and compassion (33); one must feel such kindness 
and compassion toward the offender; and one must actually 
desire that the offender flourish (34). While adopting the 
attitude of resentment involves withdrawing goodwill 
toward the offender until she either makes amends or some 
other conditions have been met, adopting the attitude of 
forgiveness involves no withdrawal of goodwill at any point.
is thoroughly laid out, she could have put more stress 
on how action and reflection are constantly intertwined. 
Experimenting with feminist actions, even if one is not fully 
convinced, is often a crucial part of the process, and gives 
a supply of materials to reflect on.
The final chapter, “Democracy and Change as Transaction,” 
takes feminist consciousness into the political arena. How 
should a feminist self think about and try to bring about 
change in oppressive social institutions? Fischer clarifies 
how for feminists and pragmatists, the dualisms separating 
ethics from politics and the private from the public sphere 
do not hold. Personal identity is socially embedded 
and always functions in interaction with public spaces 
and meanings. Fischer appreciates Dewey’s model of 
democracy as cooperative inquiry. She supplements it with 
Iris Young’s model of inclusive participatory democracy, 
finding Young more attuned than Dewey to variations 
in communicative style, and thus more open to women 
and other non-dominant groups. Concerned that Young’s 
focus on procedural matters makes her deliberators thin 
and ethereal, Fischer supplements Young’s model with 
Jane Addams’s story of how many of the old immigrant 
women living in her Chicago neighborhood found meaning 
and comfort in the “devil baby,” rumored to be residing 
at Hull House. Addams’s open receptivity and sympathetic 
understanding enabled her to find wisdom in people with 
vastly different communicative styles, belief systems, and 
patterns of living. Fischer moves nimbly among these 
models and makes a good case for bringing them together. 
I wish Fischer had said more about how becoming able to 
do what Young advocates and Addams demonstrates, is a 
matter of developing habits of listening and understanding 
that take much time and practice to acquire. All the same, 
as in previous chapters, Fischer works carefully and 
appreciatively with her material. The model she develops 
is worthy of serious consideration.
An author cannot cover everything in one book. There are 
implications of the feminist-pragmatist self not addressed 
that I hope Fischer and/or others will explore in the future. 
Now I speak as an insider. I find the feminist-pragmatist 
conception of the self and of the process of change more 
convincing than alternative constructions. Yet, there are 
disquieting implications. On this view, radical change in the 
self and in social institutions is impossible. For pragmatists, 
both selves and institutions are bundles of habits. Change, 
unless violently imposed, occurs piecemeal, through 
working on a few habits at a time. The conception thus has 
a built-in conservatism to it. While at a given point in time 
one may work toward feminist consciousness or feminist 
institutional change in terms of a few habits, at the same 
time, untransformed habits continue to function, and 
continue to reinforce the status quo. Change is tenuous 
and can often be undone. On this view, it is understandable 
why the promise of the women’s rights and the civil rights 
movements of the 1960s remains unrealized a half century 
later. For a feminist-pragmatist conception of change, this 
is a sober and sometimes tragic reality. It is not a “problem” 
that can be fixed within the theory.
Regardless of whether the book is read as a collection of 
essays or as an integrated whole, the chapters are skillfully 
